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ABSTRACT
Migrations flows are not a brand-new phenomenon. Nonetheless, in these 
last years, the findings are worrying. In fact, at the end of the year 2016, 
a record was reached as the number of displaced people amounted to 65.6 
million. In this connection, it must be stressed that the European continent 
has been particularly affected by this crisis. Bearing this in mind, we have to 
mention that some Member States of the European Union have adopted their 
* Licenciada en Derecho por la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Estudió el Máster 
de Derecho de la Unión Europea y Derecho de la Competencia de la Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid, obteniendo el premio Luis Vives concedido por el Parlamento Europeo al mejor alumno 
del Máster. Es Doctora en Derecho por la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid bajo la dirección 
del profesor Antonio Remiro Brotóns con Sobresaliente Cum Laude por Unanimidad. Tiene 
experiencia laboral en organizaciones y fundaciones españolas y extranjeras consagradas al 
asesoramiento legal en procesos judiciales vinculados a graves violaciones de derechos humanos. 
Ha obtenido varias becas que le han permitido cursar en Universidades extranjeras programas 
de extensa duración en materias relacionadas con la especialidad relativo al Derecho Penal 
Internacional. En la actualidad imparte las siguientes asignaturas en la Universidad Europea 
de Madrid: Derecho Internacional Público, Derecho Penal Internacional, Derecho de la Unión 
Europea y Derechos Humanos. En mayo de 2017 obtuvo la calificación positiva de la aneca 
como Profesor Contratado Doctor. Correo electrónico: jacqueline.hellman@universidadeuropea.
es orcid: 0000-0003-2327-6010
** Recibido el 4 de enero del 2019, aprobado el 28 de enero del 2020.
Para citar el artículo: Hellman J. An approach towards the judgment rendered by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union on September 6, 2017 regarding the European Immigration 
Crisis. En Revista Derecho del Estado, Universidad Externado de Colombia. N.º 46, mayo-agosto 
de 2020, pp. 85-106.
doi: https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n46.04
86 Jacqueline Hellman
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 46, mayo-agosto de 2020, pp. 85-106
own strategies, which -in some occasions- have deviated far from the position 
imposed by the mentioned international organization. At this juncture, it is 
relevant to examine the approach that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has had in one particular case, which resulted in the long-awaited 
judgment rendered on September 6, 2017.
KEYWORDS
Relocation system; principle of solidarity; migratory movements; Court of 
Justice of the European Union.
RESUMEN
Los flujos migratorios no constituyen un fenómeno nuevo. No obstante, en 
la actualidad, los datos arrojados son alarmantes. De hecho, a finales del 
año 2016 se alcanzó un récord en la medida en que el número de personas 
desplazadas ascendió a 65,6 millones. En este sentido, debe señalarse que el 
continente europeo se ha visto especialmente afectado por esta crisis. Teniendo 
en cuenta lo anterior, debemos mencionar que algunos Estados Miembros de 
la Unión Europea han adoptado sus propias medidas, las cuales se han alejado 
-en ocasiones- de las premisas impuestas por la referida organización inter-
nacional. Ante esta situación, es relevante examinar la postura que mantuvo 
el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea en un determinado caso que dio 
lugar a la esperada sentencia del 6 de septiembre de 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
Migratory flows are not a new phenomenon. Moreover, human displacements 
made with the purpose of improving living conditions, as well as broadening 
personal horizons have always existed1. However, at present, the data thrown 
by diverse organisms and institutions are alarming insofar as the number of 
displaced persons, at the end of the year 2016, amounted to 65.6 million2. 
Specifically, in Europe, the number of migrants has exponentially increased3. 
Following all these observations and beyond the dramatic humanitarian 
considerations that can and should be made, it must be emphasized that this 
constant and growing wave of people trying to reach European Union soil is, 
inter alia, eroding one of the European Union essential pillars: the Schengen 
area; a space that began to take shape in 1985 when only five countries de-
cided to sign the Schengen Agreement with the aim of gradually eliminating 
European Union internal borders4. In this regard, it is worth noting that this 
process culminated, ten years later, with the elimination of those5. Thus, 
during the past decades, in general terms, the rule that refers to the abolition 
1 During the second millennium B.C., migratory movements were a concern for territo-
rial rulers in the Ancient Middle East, since the exercise of their power was strongly linked to 
the number of people on whom they deployed it. This has been recognized by Sánchez Sánchez 
when saying the following: “en los tratados internacionales, cartas diplomáticas y otros textos 
procedentes del antiguo mundo hitita y egipcio, ha sobrevivido una información muy significa-
tiva que evidencia la existencia de continuos flujos de población (…) [en los que se explicitaba] 
la voluntad de fijar un régimen internacional que los regulara”. Vid. Sánchez Sánchez, Víctor, 
Refugiados, cautivos, esclavos y otros emigrados en el Antiguo Oriente Medio, Madrid, Tecnos, 
2017, p. 60. 
2 The amount of people nowadays displaced exceeds post-World War II numbers. Infor-
mation available here: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/20/world/unhcr-displaced-peoples-report/
index.html 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
3 Information available in the following link:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/es/headlines/society/20170629sto78629/la-respuesta-
de-la-ue-a-la-crisis-migratoria 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
Frontex, in charge of monitoring the European borders, has indicated that in these previous 
years the arrival on inmigrants has made an important pressure on Southern European States. 
Information available in the following link:
https://www.euractiv.com/topics/illegal-migration/?type_filter=news 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
Resulta también de interés la siguiente información:
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
4 We are referring, obviously, to Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. Vid. González, José María Luque, “Schengen. Un espacio de seguridad libertad y 
justicia”, Revista de Derecho, 21, 2004, p. 140. 
5 The milestone referred to in the main body of the text was supported by a set of meas-
ures, mostly directed towards the promotion of judicial and police cooperation between Member 
States, as well as to enable the granting of visas for short stays and asylum.
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of internal border controls has been implemented within a large part of the 
European Union territory.
In light, then, of what it has been previously reflected, it is not extremely 
complex to note that the current European Union migration crisis is caus-
ing a challenge to the European Union. Moreover, it is shaking, as already 
anticipated, one of its most essential pillars, consisting in the promotion of a 
concrete physical space in which people have the possibility to move freely6. 
Faced with this risky situation, European Union institutions have designed 
various strategies7, such as: emergency actions aimed at achieving a more 
exhaustive control of external borders; attempts to adjust the European Union 
Asylum System so that asylum seekers are treated equally; measures designed 
to promote the implementation of coordinated and joint actions amongst dif-
ferent European Union countries; etc. Nevertheless and regardless of whether 
the mentioned efforts are or not suitable ones, the accent needs to be also 
placed on the fact that this particular phenomenon is causing struggles between 
Member States and this is, of course, jeopardizing -once again- the attainment 
of the objectives set out in the Schengen acquis, which is enshrined in the 
Schengen Borders Code of 2006 (sbc)8. This instrument indicated that the 
signatory States had to eliminate the obstacles introduced to protect internal 
borders, although limitations could be established on the ground of protect-
ing their public policy or internal security. These conditions considered, at 
first, as exceptional were invoked with greater assiduity than expected due 
6 The aforementioned freedom constitutes the cornerstone of the figure created as a result 
of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992: the citizenship of the Union. Martín Martínez 
argues in this regard the following: “El derecho de libre circulación y residencia ha constituido 
desde sus orí- genes la clave de bóveda del proceso de integración europea, primero en la con-
secución del mercado interior y, desde su inclusión en el estatuto de la ciudadanía europea, para 
el reconocimiento de un status jurídico común a todos los nacionales de los Estados miembros 
que les permite disfrutar del mismo tratamiento con independencia de su nacionalidad”. Cfr. 
Martín Martínez, Magdalena, “Los límites a la libre circulación de personas en la ue por razones 
de orden público, seguridad o salud pública en tiempos de crisis: una revaluación a la luz de la 
jurisprudencia del tjue”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 18 (49), 2014, p. 768. 
7 Information available in the following link:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/ 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
8 To this respect we should take into account a relevant statement made by Mangas 
Martín, as she understands that the implementation of the Schengen Borders Code has meant 
that borders throughout the European Union have visibly smoothed away. Vid. Mangas Martín, 
Araceli, “Territorio, integridad territorial y fronteras del Estado en la Unión Europea”, Revista 
Jurídica de la Universidad de León, 2, 2015, p. 230. In this spirit, it is advisable to highlight the 
impact that the sbc has, which is considered to be “(…) a crucial element in charge of updating 
and amending the existing regulation concerning border checks carried out on people”. Likewise: 
Cfr. Hellman, Jacqueline et Molina, María José, “The erosion of the European integration process 
due to certain restrictions of the free movement of persons”, Revista Universitaria Europea, 22, 
2015, p. 32.
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to the repercussion of certain events9. As it can be envisaged, this not only 
gives the idea that the Schengen project has been subjected to changes, but 
also suggests the reason of many existing conflicts between countries: there 
have been States that supported the imposition of border controls against 
others who thought that a free physical space had to be necessarily ensured10. 
Given this situation, the European Union Commission firmly stated, in 
2011, that the strategies that affected Schengen in one way or another had 
to be devised and executed at a supranational level “(…) in a spirit of soli-
darity and/or at national level, to better comply with the common rules”11. 
Therefore, at that point, the imposition of borders was considered to be an 
internal measure of last resort that could only be applied when a threat to 
the national security or to the public policy, recognized by European Union 
institutions, occurred. This caused a strong controversy amongst States that 
was seriously aggravated after the incident of Lampedusa (whereby more 
than three hundred refugees died near the Italian coasts), which led to the 
modification of the sbc through the Regulation 1051/2013. 
Within this context, we have to highlight that, for some time now, many 
debates and proposals have proliferated with the objective of claiming a re-
striction of the European Union area of free movements12. As a consequence 
of this, in September 2017, the European Union Commission proposed to 
9 This is especially palpable in the face of events of a certain magnitude. In this sense, 
the Arab spring, which began in 2010 and led to an increase in the arrival of immigrants to Eu-
rope -particularly Tunisian nationals- is an example worth mentioning. At that time, the Italian 
government tried unsuccessfully to find a solution for those individuals fleeing from poverty, 
conflict, persecution, etc., and decided to grant them a residence permit for a period of six months, 
being able to move around the Schengen area. Immediately after, the French government disap-
pointed with such measure agreed to block trains coming from the Italian city of Vintimille as 
a consequence of the exceptional situation that aroused at that precise moment. 
10 In this regard, Lehne has insisted that the European Union has beeen divided: “at 
the beginning of the 2015–2016 crisis, eu member states divided into sharply opposed camps. 
Some Northern and Western European countries -such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden- joined Germany in prioritizing humanitarian concerns and allowing hundreds of 
thousands of migrants to cross their borders. Other Western European countries, such as France 
and the uk, responded more cautiously and took far fewer migrants. The Central European states 
immediately opted for restrictive policies”. Cfr. Lehne, Stefan, “The eu Remains Unprepared for 
the Next Migration Crisis”, Carnegie Europe, 3, 1-7, 2018:
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/03/eu-remains-unprepared-for-next-migration-crisis-
pub-75965 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
11 Information hereby available: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/pdf/1_en_act_
part1_v11_en.pdf 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
12 In other words, the above circumstances have resulted in initiatives that have one 
specific aim: expanding border controls on an exceptional basis. Vid. Dandashly, Assem, “The 
European Union’s response to the Syrian conflict. Too little, too late […]”, Global Affairs, 2 (4), 
2016, p. 397.
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extend to a maximum of three years the period in which States would be able 
to reintroduce checks at the internal borders of the Schengen area. Govern-
ments would only implement this measure in cases of security threat13. This 
initiative seemed to be justified in the terrorist risk that Europe has been 
suffering lately, although certainly the massive migratory arrival is another 
essential reason. Obviously, the complex and long Syrian conflict is stretch-
ing positions to the limit, as this has meant a considerable increase in the 
number of people trying to arrive to Europe. 
At this juncture, we must stress that European Union institutions have 
been traditionally reluctant to admit more exceptions to one of the most 
precious symbols of the European Union integration: the free movement 
in the Schengen area14. Therefore, the aforementioned proposal determined 
that the referred temporal extension should not operate in an automatic way 
and, also, it stated that the Council had to intervene. Being things as they 
are nowadays, it seems crucial to analyse the position adopted quite recently 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) in order to find out if, 
at present, the mentioned institution is stopping or, instead, “unleashing” 
the actions of some European Member States, manifestly inclined to put a 
drastic end to the migrant movement through measures that contradict the 
13 Information below available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ip-17-3407_en.htm 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
The proposal stated the following: “Member States will also be able to exceptionally prolong 
controls if the same threat persists beyond one year and when commensurate exceptional national 
measures within the territory, such as a state of emergency, have also been taken to address this 
threat. Such prolongation would require a Recommendation of the Council, which would need 
to take into account the opinion given by the Commission and would be strictly limited to 6 
month periods with the possibility to prolong no more than three times up to a maximum period 
of two years”. 
14 This has been supported by the European Union in many occasions. Bearing this in 
mind, we should take into account a recent communication made by the European Commission 
in September, 2017: “In an area without internal border control, the temporary reintroduction of 
internal border control may only be decided in exceptional circumstances to provide a response 
to situations seriously affecting the public policy or internal security of that area, of parts thereof, 
or of one or more Member States. Overall, the use of temporary reintroduction of border con-
trol shows that the Member States apply this measure in a responsible manner. (…) While the 
Schengen area faced these critical and unprecedented challenges, the eu and its Member States 
have worked together to take action to reinforce the external borders and ensure security and 
public order to secure the Schengen area of free movement. The ultimate objective remains to go 
back to a normally functioning Schengen area without controls at internal borders”. Document 
hereby available:
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/20170927_communication_on_preserving_and_strengthening_schengen_
en.pdf 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
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spirit and purpose of Schengen regulations. Consequently, we must carry 
out an in-depth analysis of the judgment rendered on September 6, 2017[15] 
1. ANALYSING THE JUDICIAL DECISION RENDERED 
BY THE CJEU ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2017
1.1. A detailed background of the judgment issued on September 6, 2017
As already indicated, the cjeu on September 6, 2017, rendered —at an es-
pecially difficult time— a ruling that referred to the increase of migratory 
flows within the European Union territory. In fact, by means of the mentioned 
sentence, the Court had the opportunity to adopt a position regarding the 
relocation system established for applicants who came from third countries 
and were seeking for international protection in Member States. More spe-
cifically, it is necessary to clarify that the Council of the European Union 
designed the referred mechanism of relocation as a result of the undeniable 
migratory pressure that some Mediterranean countries of the eu have been 
suffering in the last few years16. Thus, the timing of the referred court ruling 
could not have been more opportune taking into account the challenges that 
this international organization has, in recent times, faced when dealing with 
this particular “hazard”. Consequently, it is extremely useful to reach back 
to the root causes of the cases that gave birth to the aforementioned judicial 
decision in order to understand the strategies addressed by the eu institutions 
in a moment in which, as it has been explained before, the migrants’ move-
ments was reaching its peak. 
Bearing the above in mind, firstly, we have to mention that, a few years 
ago, the European Union Commission called “(…) for concrete measures of 
solidarity towards the frontline Member States. In particular, at a joint meeting 
of Foreign and Interior Ministers on 20 April 2015, the [European] Commis-
sion presented a 10-point plan of immediate action to be taken in response 
15 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic, Hungary v. Council of the 
European Union. Document hereby available:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=uriserv%3aoj.C_.2017.374.01.000 
4.01.eng 
16 The European Union Commission has recently declared that the relocation system is 
finally coming to an end after a splendid period of time where mostly every single individual 
has been duly relocated, underpinning the magnificent results obtained with the mentioned pro-
cedure. The eu Migration Commissioner, Avramopoulos, said the following words: “With the eu 
relocation scheme successfully coming to an end, we have made enormous progress on relocation 
over the past two years. This shows that responsibility can be successfully shared within the eu. 
We are committed to provide financial support to those Member States who continue to show 
solidarity with Greece and Italy”. Information hereby available:
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/20171114_relocation_eu_solidarity_between_member_states_en.pdf 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
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to the crisis, including a commitment to consider options for an emergency 
relocation mechanism”17. Within this context, the Council of the European 
Union adopted the Decision 2015/1523[18] which meant the establishment of 
provisional measures of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece in order to reinforce solidarity and responsibility among all Member 
States. As said before, this temporal and exceptional instrument, addressed 
to support the countries that severely suffered the effects of unprecedented 
migratory movements, had one specific objective: the imposition of a reloca-
tion system from Italy and Greece to other European Member States regarding 
people likely to be subjected to international protection. In a nutshell, the 
significant pressure made towards the migration and asylum system of the 
two listed countries, led to the setting up of a solidarity regime that undoubt-
edly intended to alleviate their burden[19].
In the same vein, the European Commission ascertained that there was a 
need to confer protection to Italy, Greece and Hungary. All this resulted in 
the “Commission’s initial proposal” by which a relocation process of 120 
000 applicants for international protection had to take place in the following 
terms: from Italy (15 600 persons), Greece (50 400 persons) and Hungary 
(54 000 persons), to the other Member States[20] Not long after, on September 
22, the Council through qualified majority adopted the mentioned Commis-
sion’s initiative by means of the Decision 2015/1601 with the same objectives 
contained in the Decision 2015/1523[21] It should be observed that article 4 of 
17 Document below available:
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=194081&pageIndex=0&
doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=605480 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
18 Document below available:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/Html/?uri=celex:32015D1523&from=en 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
19 According to article 4 of the mentioned Decision, “(…) 24 000 applicants shall be relo-
cated from Italy to the territory of the other Member States; 16 000 applicants shall be relocated 
from Greece to the territory of the other Member States”. 
20 In parallel, the referred institution on the basis of article 78 (3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) made a proposal to modify Regulation number 
604/2013 with the aim of establishing appropriate mechanisms for determining Member States 
responsibility when examining an application made to obtain international protection by a national 
from a third country or a stateless person.
21 Document below available:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/Html/?uri=celex:32015D1601&from=en 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
It must be mentioned that the Decision 2016/1754 of 2016 amended the cited Decision 
of 2015/1601 stating the following: “Member States may choose to meet their obligation by 
admitting to their territory Syrian nationals present in Turkey under national or multilateral 
legal admission schemes for persons in clear need of international protection, other than the 
resettlement scheme which was the subject of the Conclusions of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council of 20 July 2015”. In this context, 
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the former determined the way in which 120 000 applicants had to be relocated 
by other Member States. In this respect, we have to highlight that, strikingly, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic voted against 
its adoption and, hence, contested its content. Likewise, it may be of interest 
to note that the main difference between the two cited Decisions lies in the 
existence of “(…) an intricate mix of intergovernmental and Union decision 
making”22 in the first legal instrument mentioned in the present paper, whereas 
the referred feature cannot be detected in the second one. 
Be that as it may, it must be stressed that Slovakia, in Case C-643/15, 
claimed for the annulment of the Decision 2015/1601 and Hungary, in Case 
C-647/15, had a similar request, culminating in a joint and single judicial pro-
cess in which they received the support of Poland23. They denounced -among 
other things- that the contested Decision violated the principle of subsidiarity, 
proportionality, certainty, etc., whereas, Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Commission fully underpinned the 
Council’s position, materialized in the controversial legal instrument. Thus, 
within this context, below we will analyse in detail the concrete and asser-
tive parties’ objections made towards the disputed Decision and, of course, 
the Court’s reasoning geared towards those with the intention of determining 
how and in which way the European Union is facing the European migration 
crisis that, undoubtedly, has become an on-going challenge24.
 
1.2. Analysing the parties’ objections to the Decision 
2015/1601 and the most relevant arguments provided by the 
cjeu regarding the judgment issued on September 6, 2017 
In view of the above, we must firmly acknowledge that the Decision 1215/1601 
entailed the implementation of an emergency relocation scheme which tried 
to alleviate the strain caused to certain countries by the significant rise of 
migrant arrivals through sea and land —around a million people along the 
it is important to take into account the statement issued the 18th of May of 2016 by the eu and 
Turkey about immigration. 
Document below available:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
22 Cfr. Timmermans, Christiaan, “The Competence Divide of the Lisbon Treaty Six Years 
After”, en: The Division of Competences between the eu and the Member States, 19-33, S. Garben 
& I. Goavere, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 29. 
23 Regarding the legislative procedure followed, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Czech 
Republic opposed to the content of the mentioned Decision, which was finally adopted through 
qualified majority. 
24 Information hereby available: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629sto78630/eu-migrant-
crisis-facts-and-figures 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
94 Jacqueline Hellman
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 46, mayo-agosto de 2020, pp. 85-106
year 2015—25, constituting -for some authors- a “(…) timid step forward in 
addressing the central controversies of the current refugee debate in Europe”26. 
That being so, the first concern that the cjeu had when dealing with the 
validity of the mentioned legal instrument was to determine, as argued by the 
Slovak Republic —in its second plea— and Hungary —in its first plea—, if 
article 78.3 of the tfeu (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union)27 
was or not a suitable legal basis for the contested Decision in accordance 
with article 289 of the tfeu, which refers to the European Union legislative 
procedure. For that matter, the countries that expressed its opposition to the 
mentioned legal tool argued that it should be considered a non-legislative 
act that —inexplicably, from their point of view— derogated a legislative 
one. To this effect, the Court firstly understood, in paragraphs 65 and 66, that 
“article 78(3) tfeu (…) does not contain an express reference to either the 
ordinary legislative procedure or the special legislative procedure”; therefore, 
“(…) it must be held that measures which are capable of being adopted on the 
basis of Article 78(3) tfeu must be classified as ‘non-legislative acts’ because 
they are not adopted at the end of a legislative procedure”. Following on from 
that, Ovádek declares that “it is rare for the Council to lay down binding rules 
in a non-legislative act in an area covered by the tfeu; such acts are more 
commonly associated with the provenance of the cfsp [Common Foreign 
and Security Policy] or implementing measures adopted by the Commission. 
The interpretation of this point confirmed the Court’s preference for a formal 
approach to assessing the nature of eu acts which is consistent with Article 
289 tfeu, leaving to the side the fact that the procedure in Article 78(3) tfeu 
provides for the involvement (consultation) of the European Parliament in a 
way similar to the special legislative procedure”28. 
Anyhow, once the above clarification was made, the Court promptly ex-
amined if the legal provision was or not an appropriate one. In this regard, 
25 There is no doubt that the recent and critical situation generated by the immigration crisis 
in the eu entailed the implementation of many different strategies and, of course, the relocation 
procedure proved to be an accurate idea from the standpoint of European institutions, whom 
decided to firmly opt to it. In this regard, it must be mentioned that the Decision 2015/1601 has 
been considered as the ultimate expression of the same. Information hereby available:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/
file-permanent-eu-relocation-mechanism 
26 Cfr. brsakoska bazerkosk, julija, “The refugee relocation system in eu and its im-
plications to the countries on the Western Balkans route: the aftermath of the flawed reception 
conditions in the eu”, La Revue des Droits de l´Homme, 13, 2018, p. 3. 
27 Article 78 (3) of the tfeu enables the Council to adopt emergency actions regarding an 
exceptional situation: the sudden influx of nationals from third countries. 
28 Cfr. ovádek, micHal, “Legal basis and solidarity of provisional measure in Slovakia 
and Hungary v. Council”, European Database of Asylum Law, 2017:
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/legal-basis-and-solidarity-provisional-
measures-slovakia-and-hungary-v-council 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
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the cjeu stated that the tfeu provided the possibility of temporary derogat-
ing legislative acts of eu law29, including articles contained in the Dublin III 
Regulation, as it can be evidenced through the following statement contained 
in paragraph 77: “(…) the concept of ‘provisional measures’ within the 
meaning of Article 78(3) tfeu must be sufficiently broad in scope to enable 
the eu institutions to adopt all the provisional measures necessary to respond 
effectively and swiftly to an emergency situation characterised by a sudden 
inflow of nationals of third countries”.
Accordingly, the Court —in paragraph 79— added that the disputed De-
cision was not willing to neither replace nor permanently amend provisions 
of legislative acts. In other words, the measures adopted by the Council 
were designed to ensure a quick and effective response through a temporary 
and, therefore, provisional arrangement. All these arguments lead the cjeu 
to declare that the contested legal instrument was not violating the analysed 
and previously mentioned legal provision of the tfeu despite the fact that the 
migratory events were —as Slovakia claimed— reasonably foreseeable. On 
this last point, the cjeu endorsed —in paragraph 113— that while the earlier 
reasoning was a true one -by admitting that the inflow of nationals from 
third countries to Italy and Greece could not classify as “(…) ‘sudden’ for 
the purposes of Article 78 (3) tfeu, since it represented the continuation of 
what was already a large inflow of such nationals in 2014 and was therefore 
foreseeable”-, it was likewise so that there was a sharp influx of people flee-
ing to those countries during the summer of 2015[30] emphasizing that article 
78.3 of the tfeu was not randomly applied. Hence, the cjeu moved far away 
from the approach that Slovakia had.   
29 The cjeu insists on the idea of temporariness, highlighting that the period of twenty-four 
months given in order to ensure the effectiveness of the measures contained in the Decision is 
“(…) reasonable in view of ensuring that the measures provided for in this Decision have a real 
impact in respect of supporting Italy and Greece in dealing with the significant migration flows 
on their territories”.
30 In this respect, in paragraph 123, we find a similar statement: “It must be held that in 
such circumstances the Council could, without making a manifest error of assessment, classify 
such an increase as ‘sudden’ for the purposes of Article 78(3) tfeu even though that increase 
represented the continuation of a period in which extremely high numbers of migrants had 
already arrived”. Additionally, the cjue argues —in paragraph 128— the following: “the inflow 
of migrants with which the Greek and Italian asylum systems were confronted in 2015 was on 
such a scale that it would have disrupted any asylum system, even one without structural weak-
nesses”. In the same vein, the judicial body makes some clarifications regarding the argument 
posed by Slovakia by which the mentioned Decision was not adopted under a real emergency 
framework: “(…) [the] situation had patently arisen before the date on which the contested deci-
sion was adopted even though it is apparent from paragraph 16 of the decision that the Council 
also took account of the fact that the emergency situation would very probably continue owing 
to the ongoing [sic] instability and conflicts in the immediate vicinity of Italy and Greece”. This 
corresponds to paragraph 130. 
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Moving on to other arguments, the Court examined if the European Un-
ion institutions when adopting the referred Decision violated the principle 
of proportionality. Slovakia considered that “(…) the relocation mechanism 
[designed by the mentioned instrument] (…) is not capable of redressing the 
structural defects in the Greek and Italian asylum systems”31. In reference to 
this, the cjeu argued, in paragraph 213, that “the mechanism for relocating a 
significant number of applicants in clear need of international protection (…) 
cannot be considered a measure that is manifestly inappropriate for working 
towards that objective”32. When analysing the arguments given by Hungary 
based on the same idea of the other mentioned country, the Court declared 
that the temporary relocation system was not only adjusted pursuant to the 
situation of Member States, but also quotas were established through an 
allocation key, ensuring “(…) that the distribution of the persons relocated 
(…) [was] proportionate to the economic weight of each of those States and 
to the migration pressure on their asylum systems”33.
Likewise, as a key outcome, the cjeu understood that the measure adopted 
by the Council was a necessary one due to the inflow of migrants on an 
unprecedented scale. For that matter, the Court concluded -in paragraph 
252- that: “the Council, when adopting the contested decision, was in fact 
required (…) to give effect to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States, 
which applies, under Article 80 tfeu, when the eu common policy on asylum 
is implemented”; clarifying immediately after that “article 78(3) tfeu seeks 
to ensure that effective action is taken and does not prescribe for that purpose 
any period within which provisional measures must be implemented”. Hence, 
the Court recognized in some way the undisputable role that the principle 
of solidarity has within the framework of the European Union immigration 
policy34. However, at this point, the question is if, in the present case, the 
31 This corresponds to paragraph 210. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the Council 
is truly aware about the structural defects of the Greek and Italian asylum systems.
32 In line with the above, the cjeu adds -in paragraph 221- that “(…) the legality of an 
eu act cannot depend on retrospective assessments of its efficacy. Where the eu legislature is 
obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately 
foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light 
of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question”.
33 This corresponds to paragraph 301. Hence, there is no doubt about the position held 
in this respect by the Court of Justice of the eu, understanding that it was an appropriate one 
regarding “(…) the situation that was created by a large refugee influx in frontline states and that 
it contributes to enabling Greece and Italy to deal with the impact of the crisis, and that it was 
proportionate”. Cfr. Šabić, Šelo, “The relocation of refugees in the European Union”, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, 2017, p. 8.
34 Within this context, it must be noted that the cjeu referred also to other important 
principles, such as the principles of legal certainty and of normative clarity. In this vein, the 
Court declared —in paragraphs 327 and 328— the following: “the contested decision refer, with 
sufficient detail and precision, to the measures that may be taken by the Member States, on the 
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cjeu is sufficiently categorical in giving the above its due “weight”. Bearing 
this in mind, we have no option but to point out, in the following heading, 
main legal considerations of the latter. 
2. RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE JUDICIAL 
DECISION RENDERED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2017
In previous paragraphs we have analysed the judicial resolution rendered 
as a result of the opposition expressed by certain European Member States 
towards the temporal measures adopted by the Council in 2015, which had as 
objective the establishment of a relocating system in charge of “sweetening” 
the significant migrant pressure that Italy and Greece have suffered during 
years. Now, we should stress the impact and the extent that the mentioned 
sentence might likely have in a not too distant future, linking it with the 
principle of solidarity and, somehow, with the commitment undertaken by 
the eu decades ago of ensuring a space without borders. 
2.1. Is the principle of solidarity firmly endorsed through 
the judicial decision rendered on September 6, 2017?
As many have argued, the court ruling rendered on September 6, 2017, was 
awaited with high hopes. In fact, some understood that Slovakia and Hun-
gary “(…) ironically gave the cjeu the necessary platform to make a rather 
lengthy statement endorsing the majoritarian position among the Member 
States as regards the validity and necessity of the relocation mechanism”35. 
Thus, the mentioned judicial decision “(…) is bound to be invoked in future 
disputes and policy”36. 
Moreover, even before the judgment in question was issued, there was -in 
previous years- a great discussion around the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing responsibility within the eu migration policy, emerging entrenched 
positions on the subject. Obviously, European Union secondary tools that 
were referring to these ideas helped to stimulate the debate. In this regard, 
Obradovic declares that the Decision adopted by the Council in 2015 “(….) 
represents a concrete expression of the principle of solidarity, it is capable of 
imposing the legal obligation of solidarity. Consequently, the duty of solidarity 
in this domain of eu law is enforceable when it is transformed into a valid, 
basis of a number of eu legislative acts forming part of the acquis relating to the common asylum 
policy (…). In addition, Article 6 (5) of the contested decision provides, clearly and precisely, that 
an applicant for, or beneficiary of, international protection who enters the territory of a Member 
State other than the Member State of relocation without fulfilling the conditions for stay in that 
other Member State shall be required to return immediately to the Member State of relocation”. 
35 Cfr. ovádek, micHal, op. cit.  
36 Ibidem. 
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legally binding obligation through the process of the adoption of concrete 
measures in accordance with a Treaty-based legislative procedure”37. There-
upon, when the court case aroused it gained prominent attention, as many 
legal experts anticipated that relevant legal considerations were going to be 
made by the cjeu regarding this specific topic.  
Within this context, we cannot fail to mention relevant statements contained 
in the opinion delivered in the present case by the Advocate General Bot, who 
argued (in paragraph 17) that the mentioned principle must be envisaged as 
“(…) the quintessence of what is both the raison d’être and the objective of 
the European Project”38. Additionally, Bot highlighted the following idea: 
“the requirement of solidarity remains at the heart of the process of integra-
tion pursued by the Treaty of Lisbon. Although surprisingly absent from the 
list in the first sentence of Article 2 teu of the values on which the Union is 
founded, solidarity is, on the other hand, mentioned in the Preamble to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as forming part of the 
‘indivisible, universal values’ on which the Union is founded.39 Furthermore, 
Article 3(3) teu states that the Union is to promote not only ‘solidarity between 
generations’ but also ‘solidarity among Member States”40. Thus, the message 
provided by the mentioned Advocate General was a clear one: solidarity has 
to be considered a fundamental eu value and principle; in other words, the 
latter should be contemplated as a key pillar of the historic European Union 
project that appeared after the end of the Second World War. In this spirit, it 
must be stressed that, undoubtedly, the Treaty of Lisbon promotes a common 
policy of migration based on, among others, solidarity41. 
37 Cfr. obradovic, daniela, “Cases C-643 and C-645/15: Enforcing solidarity in eu 
migration policy”, European Law blog, 2017:
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/10/02/cases-c-643-and-c-64715-enforcing-solidarity-in-
eu-migration-policy/ 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
38 Document available below:
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=193374&pageIndex=0&
doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1439527 
(last access: 22/12/2018).
39 Vid. cHetail, vicent, “The Common European Asylum System: Bric-à-brac or Sys-
tem?”, in: Reforming the common European asylum system: the New European refugee law, 
Vincent, Chetail, De Bruycker, Philippe and   Maiani, Francesco (eds), Brill, 2016, p. 21. 
40 Within this context, we must mention article 1 a) from the Lisbon Treaty, which states 
that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. 
41 Vid. goig martínez, juan manuel, “La política común de inmigración en la Unión 
Europea en el sesenta aniversario de los tratados de Roma (o la historia de un fracaso)”, Revista 
de Derecho de la Unión Europea, 32, 2017, p. 79.  
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In the light of all the above and considering that the Court dismissed the 
actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the measures adopted by the 
Council in 2015 in charge of relocating asylum seekers that came from third 
States, it must be emphasized that surprisingly no robust nor overwhelming 
thinking was made of the principle of solidarity by the judicial body. This 
is especially noteworthy if we bear in mind that the provisional mechanism 
of relocation was addressed to help Greece and Italy under solidarity terms, 
just as the cjeu admitted in paragraph 252: “(…) the Council, when adopt-
ing the contested decision, was in fact required, as is stated in paragraph 2 
of the decision, to give effect to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
States, which applies, under Article 80 tfeu, when the eu common policy 
on asylum is implemented”. In this regard, it is important to mention that 
article 80 of the tfeu clearly establishes that the referred principle should 
be considered as a main guideline that has to be fully accomplished when 
defining the strategies that refer to the field of asylum and migration; how-
ever, it must be underlined, at the same time, that the latter legal provision 
is somewhat diffuse42. In fact, some authors argue that the concept of soli-
darity is solely related with European Union citizens or a European Union 
“ingredient” involved43. 
Of course, as it could not be otherwise, the European Union judicial organ 
acknowledges that the principle of solidarity governs the eu asylum policy. 
Hence, it does not deny it; however, sadly, the cjeu did not add anything of 
substance to the present discussion. Inexplicably, there is no rotund state-
ment made in one or other way. As Labayle claims, the present case should 
have deserved a stronger commentary from the Court44. In this regard the 
42 Vid. KogovŠeK Šalamon, neza, “The principle of solidarity in asylum and migration 
within the context of the European Union accession process”, Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, 24 (5), 2017, p. 689. In this regard, Kogovšek Šalamon stated the follow-
ing: “The provision contained in Article 80 tfeu is written in broad and undefined way, providing 
for a wide scope of interpretation. Hence, the operationalization of the principle of solidarity can 
result in many different forms of burden- sharing instruments”. Ibidem.  
43 Vid. mitsilegas, valsamis, “Humanizing solidarity in European refugee law: The 
promise of mutual recognition”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24 (5), 
2017, 723.
44 Vid. labayle, Henri, “Solidarity is not a value: Provisional relocation of asylum-seekers 
confirmed by the Court of Justice (6 September 2017, Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 
Slovakia and Hungary v. Council)”, Asylum, European Court of Justice, Solidarity, 2017:
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/solidarity-is-not-a-value-provisional-relocation-of-asylum-
seekers-confirmed-by-the-court-of-justice-6-september-2017-joined-cases-c-64315-and-c-
64715-slovakia-and-hungary-v-council/ 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
In the same vein, other authors have proclaimed the following idea: “From the wording 
of [article 80] (...) the provision, it is clear that it does not impose concrete and practical legal 
obligations on the eu institutions and the Member States, but rather defines a binding guiding 
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mentioned author proclaims that “the Court of Justice could have opted for a 
direct approach, similar to that of its Advocate General, to deliver one of the 
praetorian phrases of which it alone has the secret, consisting in conspicu-
ously recognizing all its legal strength to the principle formulated in article 
80 tfue”45. In fact, pursuant to his opinion, the cjeu is giving meaning to the 
“term of solidarity enshrined in the Treaty […] only in theoretical terms”46. 
Consequently, we can conclude that the hereto-analysed judicial decision has 
a limited added value with, unfortunate, obvious statements, as according to 
the mentioned legal provision, immigration policies should be governed by 
the referred principle47. Hence, we strongly consider that the Court should 
have done more forceful statements. 
Once we have clarified that the Court is not properly supporting the 
mentioned principle, it is worth exploring the position that the same holds 
within the European Union law framework. Having said so, we must bear in 
mind that some scholars suggest that the principle of solidarity is not only 
a prescriptive one48, but also -in accordance with relevant statements made 
by the cjeu -contained in paragraph 291- it cannot be split up. Others have 
declared that the Court’s approach towards the referred principle may vary 
or have different effect if a legislative measure has been or not applied49. 
Likewise, it has been said that solidarity depends very much “(…) on the 
specific circumstances of the sector in which it shall apply”50. Following this 
line of thought, the next statement can be easily understood: “a eu immigration 
policy based on solidarity and fairness is not only a normative requirement 
enshrined in the Treaties, but also a functional necessity arising from the gen-
eral objective of a single market without internal frontiers, one in which the 
free movement of person is realised. This is so because once internal borders 
between eu Member States are removed, the decision of migrants to enter the 
eu becomes a common concern to all Member States”51. According to this 
thesis, it seems that the effectiveness of the principle of solidarity depends, 
in a large extent, on the existence of a particular context; relying, thus, its 
enforcement on particular and concrete circumstances52. This, however, does 
principle for policymaking and policy implementation, and it also introduces solidarity as an 
interpretative tool for use by the cjeu”. Cfr. KogovŠeK Šalamon, neza, op. cit., p. 700. 
45 Ibidem.
46 Cfr. labayle, Henri, op. cit. 
47 Vid. goig martínez, juan manuel, op. cit., p. 81.
48 Ibid. 
49 Vid. obradovic, daniela, op. cit. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Cfr. kukuk, esin, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibilities: 
More than Window Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, p. 448. 
52 In this respect, Noll admits that the principle of solidarity contained in article 80 of 
the tfeu must be interpreted in the following way: “The prevailing interpretation of article 80 
is that it concerns solidarity merely between Member States and not between Member State 
101An approach towards the judgment rendered by the Court of Justice
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 46, mayo-agosto de 2020, pp. 85-106
not fit with the mentioned opinion of the Advocate General Bot, who argued 
that the referred principle has to be considered a value of the eu53. 
Either way, as said before, it is undisputed that serious attention was 
given to the analysed sentence, especially once the Advocate General of the 
case expressed a vigorous endorsement towards the mentioned principle. 
However, a grim feeling rapidly aroused among those who realized that “(…) 
solidarity was a notable absentee from the grand chamber judgment of the 
Court of Justice, released on 6 September 2017”[54]. Accordingly, the cjeu 
missed a relevant opportunity to take a strong stand towards the above. This 
leads us to the following idea: if a deep analysis of the mentioned principle 
would have been made, the judicial decision could have been a first-class 
point of reference55. 
2.2. Which is the status quo of Schengen after the 
judgment rendered on September 6, 2017?
Regardless of what it has been explained in the previous heading, it should 
not be forgotten the way in which the court ruling has been praised by Euro-
pean Union institutions. In this regard, the European Union Commissioner 
for Migration and Home Affairs, Dimitris Avramopoulos, proclaimed that the 
latter had to be considered an important bulwark of defence and commitment 
towards one of the basic principles in charge of promoting a physical space 
without obstacles.56 Furthermore, the mentioned Commissioner stated that 
it “was the time to work in unity and implement solidarity in full”, glorify-
and refugee, or Member States and other recipient states in crisis regions”. Cfr. noll, gregor, 
“Security in a Liberal Union: eu Asylum and Migration Control Policies”, en: The European 
Union: Facing the Challenges of Multiple Security Threats, 1-21, Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, A., 
A. Michalski, N. Nilsson, L. Oxelheim, United Kingdom, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, p. 6. 
Accordingly, Noll states that “(…) article 80 tfeu is so contradictory in its legal construction that 
it cannot lead to any practical results -neither in policy nor before the cjeu”. Ibid. 7. 
53 In paragraph 18, the Advocate General declares that the principle of solidarity is a 
founding and existential value of the Union. Other authors share the same opinion: Vid. Uçarer, 
Emek, “Mare Nostrum or Solidarity of Inaction? European Union’s Responses to the Unfolding 
Refugee and Burden-Sharing Crisis”, Paper prepared for Biennial Conference of the European 
Union Studies Association, Miami, May 4-6. 
54 Cfr. arriba-sellier, natHan, “Welcome refugees, adieu solidarité”, Public Law, 2017: 
https://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/welcome-refugees-adieu-solidarite
(last access: 22/12/2018)
55 Vid. abrisketa uriarte, juan antonio, “La reubicación de los refugiados: un déficit 
de solidaridad y una brecha en la Unión Europea. Comentario a la sentencia del Tribunal de 
Justicia de 6 de septiembre de 2017, asuntos c-643 y C-64/15 Hungría y Eslovaquia contra el 
Consejo”, Revista General de Derecho Europeo, 44, 2018, p. 128.  
56 Information available below:
https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/mundo/la-justicia-de-ue-falla-contra-hungria-y-eslovaquia-
por-no-acoger-demandantes-asilo/10001-3371148 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
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ing the content of the mentioned judicial decision. In the same vein, other 
organizations, such as Caritas Europa , argued that the judgment “sends a 
powerful message on eu’s values of solidarity and responsibility sharing”57. 
Taking into account those statements, one could consider that the Schengen 
acquis is properly backed through the analysed judicial decision. 
However, we firmly think that the recent resolution has to be approached 
with due caution when arguing that it has served as a stimulus to enforce the 
Schengen values and principles. In the same vein, Bamberg and De Somer 
state that “while the multiple crises of recent years are slowly but surely 
giving way to a renewed optimism about the European project, one of the 
European Union’s most symbolic and tangible achievements, the Schengen 
area, is not out of the danger zone yet”58; adding, also, that “(…) the eu’s poli-
cies on Schengen are strongly dominated by intergovernmental interests”59. 
The above is supported by recent events that are putting on the table -once 
again- a strong discussion about the most important challenges that are nowadays 
threatening Schengen. Obviously, the migratory movement towards Europe 
is seen, in this respect, as a main obstacle when fulfilling the objectives set 
out in the latter legal framework. Within this context, it must be highlighted 
that fresh strategies implemented by some governments on migration policy 
leaves much to be desired; reaching a point in which Schengen is clearly at 
risk. In this sense, we should refer to the Italian Prime Minister, Guiseppe 
Conte, who refused to receive -this last month of June- ships with migrants 
that finally were rescued in Spain once their access was denied in Italy and 
Malta. Clearly, this kind of episodes of special relevance is stressing vigor-
ously the following idea: denying or drastically limiting the free movement 
of persons is putting in danger the existence of the European Union itself.
Furthermore, as an epilogue of all the above, it is important to be aware 
about the data shown by the International Organization for Migration, which 
cannot be worse: “88,736 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 
2018 through 14 October, with 40,598 to Spain, the leading destination this 
year”60. Hence, massive populations movements are not only an on-going 
Of course, it has to be highlighted that Slovakia and Hungary have negatively reacted to the 
court ruling. Information hereby available:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/06/eu-court-dismisses-complaints-by-
hungary-and-slovakia-over-refugees 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
57 Cfr. bamberg, katHarina et De somer, marie, “Policy Update October 2017”, European 
Policy Centre, 2, 2017: http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=3&pub_id=8785 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
58 Cfr. bamberg, katHarina et de somer, marie, op. cit
59 Ibid.  
60 Information hereby available: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/spain/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-88736-2018-deaths-
reach-1839 
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conflict, but also it is clear that the alarming situation that those generate 
is not going to be solved overnight. Consequently, if we combine these last 
statements with the undeniable fact according to which the cjeu has lost an 
opportunity to uphold and ensure consistency towards what should be recog-
nized as a basic eu value and principle, we must receive with disappointment 
the judicial decision rendered on September 6, 2017.
CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt that the migrant flows occurred in recent years, considered 
one of the gravest since World War II, has threaten the eu stability. Of course, 
European Union institutions have reacted to this. Disregarding if the form 
of confrontation has been adequate or not61, different kind of measures were 
adopted in order to face the referred challenge. In this regard, it has to be 
mentioned that many of those strategies, designed to ease and help countries 
of first arrival located at the external borders of the eu, were accompanied 
with strong controversy62. This is the case of the Decision 2015/1601 by 
which Dublin norms’-addressed to indicate that European countries are in 
charge of examining asylum applications- were suspended and replaced by 
a specific relocation system of migrants imposed to Member States63. 
Simultaneously, due to the referred migratory crisis, actions have been 
implemented unilaterally by States, which have sadly materialised on the 
implementation of internal border controls64. This has happened despite the 
fact that the free movement of persons has been, during decades, not only 
a key achievement of the Union, but also an essential aspect of the referred 
international organization insofar as it is closely linked to the establishment 
of the main objective of the European Union integration project, underpin-
(last access: 22/12/2018)
61 The Red Cross eu office and others have severely criticized many strategies that have 
been addressed by the eu. Information hereby available:
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/no-time-waste-ngos-call-upon-eu-institutions-and-member-
states-expand-use-safe-and 
(last access: 22/12/2018)
62 Vid. leHne, stefan, op. cit.   
63 As it has been explained, the referred instrument, as many others, “(…) intended to 
reinforce internal solidarity in the eu and show the commitment of all eu Member States to share 
the migration burden with the two Mediterranean countries. Cfr. obradovic, daniela, op. cit. 
64 This unilateralism has been severely criticized. In this sense, we must take into account 
the following statements: “Given the current fragility of eu cooperation on migration -not least 
within the Schengen area- the eu institutions cannot afford to offer national governments further 
excuses to withdraw into unilateralism. Building stronger tools to help Member States manage 
future uncertainty is the surest path to rebuilding public confidence and fostering the resilience 
of the European Union more broadly”. Cfr. collet, elizabetH et le coz, camille, “After the 
storm. Learning from the eu response to the migration crisis,” Migration Policy Institute Europe, 
2018, p. 2.  
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ning in turn the very concept of citizenship of the Union. Within this context, 
we cannot forget that the tragic aftermath of the Second World War led to 
the elimination of obstacles between Member States, making this feature 
an identity mark of the eu. Therefore, the gradual loss of this characteristic 
has suggested the return to other temporal moments, such as, the Age of 
Hadrian; a period in which limitations were imposed with the purpose of 
dividing the world65.
In this situation, the judicial decision rendered by the cjeu on September 6, 
2017 turned out to be a relevant one as it referred to all the above-mentioned 
issues although the reasoning was not a vigorous one. As previously explained, 
the mentioned institution could have provided a more incisive analysis regard-
ing the principle of solidarity, just as the Advocate General of the case did by 
underlining, inter alia, the following conclusion: “solidarity is both a pillar 
and at the same time a guiding principle of the European Union’s policies 
on border checks, asylum and immigration”66. In short, it is noticeable the 
expedite and convincing arguments brought by the latter, whereas the Court 
of Justice of the European Union made basic and tenuous considerations. 
Bearing this in mind, maybe we should consider that the intention of the 
cjeu was to encourage Member States to adopt their own strategy67. Be that 
as it may, we truly think that the European Union judicial institution could 
have either confirmed the approach brought by the former or provide its 
own distinct perspective but it should not have remained silent, taking into 
account the tragic events that migratory movements in Europe are entailing.
We have to be aware that the number of migrants is not going to decrease 
significantly in the near future. As we have seen, those will surely be accom-
panied with the implementation of domestic strategies addressed, in many 
cases, to prevent or curb illegal migratory flows as much as possible. And 
those will contribute to the existence of hostilities between Member States of 
the European Union. Within this context, the following statement is a relevant 
one: “Mutual trust between Member States and trust in the eu institutions 
on which the eu is built are crumbling. This is the cumulative result of the 
inability and occasional reluctance to perform by the eu Member States at 
the external borders combined with the free-riding attitudes and restrictive 
practices of others, including Hungary and some other Visegrad countries”68. 
The picture does not look encouraging. Clearly, a powerful response should 
65 We are referring to the wall that Emperor Hadrian built in order to separate Romans 
from barbarians; a construction whose main task, according to some specialists, consisted in 
limiting migratory movements.
66 Vid. Supra. Nota 42. 
67 Vid. abrisketa uriarte, juan antonio, op. cit. 
68 Cfr. boldizsár, nagy, “Sharing the responsibility or shifting the focus? The responses 
of the eu and the Visegrad countries to the Post-2015 Arrival of Migrants and Refugees”, iai, 17, 
2017, p. 15. 
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be issued sooner or later by the European Union institutions encouraging 
Member States to adopt appropriate initiatives in this field. 
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